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GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
          Appellant Damond Goggins appeals from a judgment of 
conviction and sentence in this criminal case.  He limits his 
appeal to the contention that the district court improperly 
imposed a 2-level enhancement of his sentencing level under 
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) ("section 2D1.1(b)(1)") for possession of 
a firearm.  The issue before us is whether the court was barred 
from imposing this enhancement by the circumstance that the court 
previously had sentenced Goggins to a later vacated five-year 
sentence for using and carrying a firearm during and in relation 
to a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) 
("section 924(c)(1)").   
 
              I.  Background and Procedural History 
          The case originated with Goggins's arrest on August 10, 
1994, when the police, while executing a search warrant in 
Pricedale, Pennsylvania, found him lying on a bed with a loaded 
firearm in a bedroom in which there also was a substantial 
quantity of cocaine base.  The ensuing procedural steps in the 
case had a routine start but later took an unusual turn.  A grand 
jury indicted Goggins for possession with intent to distribute in 
excess of five grams of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 
841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B)(iii) and for using and carrying a 
firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime in 
violation of section 924(c)(1).  Goggins pleaded guilty to both 
counts of the indictment.  The district court calculated his 
total offense level as 23 and his criminal history category as 
IV.  These calculations yielded a sentencing range of 130 to 147 
months because of the requirement in section 924(c)(1) that the 
court impose a five-year sentence on that charge consecutive to 
the sentence on the drug possession count.  The court sentenced 
Goggins to a 130-month term divided between 70 months on the 
possession charge and 60 months on the weapons offense.  The 
government did not urge that the court increase his sentencing 
level for possession of a firearm pursuant to section 2D1.1(b)(1) 
and the court did not do so.  Goggins then appealed. 
          While the appeal was pending the Supreme Court decided 
Bailey v. United States, 116 S.Ct. 501 (1995), in which it held 
that section 924(c)(1) requires "active employment" of a firearm 
and not mere "proximity and accessibility" during the drug 
trafficking offense.  Id. at 505.  Goggins and the government 
agreed that Goggins's conduct did not violate section 924(c)(1) 
as construed in Bailey.  Consequently they stipulated that the 
appeal would be dismissed in order that Goggins could move in the 
district court to vacate his conviction under section 924(c)(1) 
so that his sentence could be reduced by five years.  The 
parties, however, could not agree on whether section 2D1.1(b)(1) 
would be applicable on the resentencing and thus they did not 
make a stipulation on that point.  On December 29, 1995, in 
accordance with the stipulation, we dismissed the appeal. 
          Goggins then moved in the district court to vacate the 
sentence and on March 6, 1996, the district court entered an 
order vacating the sentence.  The district court also ordered 
that the parties file briefs on the question of whether section 
2D1.1(b)(1) would be applicable at the resentencing.  
          On March 11, 1996, the district court filed Amended 
Tentative Findings and Rulings Concerning Disputed Facts or 
Factors.  The court held that section 2D1.1(b)(1) was, in terms, 
applicable as the guideline calls for imposition of the 
enhancement "if the weapon was present, unless it is clearly 
improbable that the weapon was connected with the offense."  
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, Commentary n.3.  In this regard the court 
relied principally on United States v. Mitchell, 31 F.3d 271, 
277-78 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 455 (1994) (holding 
that presence and accessibility of weapon trigger enhancement).  
Here the weapon clearly was present in the bedroom when the 
police arrested Goggins and it was not improbable that the weapon 
was connected with the offense.  For two reasons the court would 
not follow United States v. Watts, 67 F.3d 790, 796-98 (9th Cir. 
1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 1369 (1996), which held that a 
court could not impose a section 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement if a 
jury acquitted the defendant under section 924(c)(1).  First, a 
jury had not acquitted Goggins.  Second, the court found Wattsunpersuasive 
as Watts reached a result contrary to that in the 
three other cases which the court cited holding that an acquittal 
on a section 924(c)(1) count does not preclude a section 
2D1.1(b)(1) sentencing enhancement.  See United States v. 
Billops, 43 F.3d 281, 288 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 
S.Ct. 1389 (1995); United States v. Romulus, 949 F.2d 713, 716-17 
(4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 992, 112 S.Ct. 1690 
(1992); United States v. Coleman, 947 F.2d 1424, 1428-29 (10th 
Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 972, 112 S.Ct. 1590 (1992). 
          The court next rejected Goggins's argument that the 
application of section 2D1.1(b)(1) violated double jeopardy 
principles as we have held repeatedly that if convictions on some 
counts of a multi-count indictment are vacated the court may 
resentence the defendant to enhanced sentences on the remaining 
counts.  See, e.g., United States v. Busic, 639 F.2d 940, 949-50 
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 918, 101 S.Ct. 3055 (1981).  
Finally, the court rejected Goggins's arguments that collateral 
estoppel, the law of the case doctrine, and waiver precluded 
application of section 2D1.1(b)(1).   
          The court then calculated Goggins's adjusted offense 
level as 25 using the section 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement.  Thus, 
predicated on a criminal history category of IV, he was subject 
to a sentencing range of 84 to 105 months.  The court imposed a 
sentence of 84 months to be followed by a five-year term of 
supervised release.  Goggins then appealed again. 
 
                          II. Discussion 
          On this appeal Goggins contends that the district court 
should not have applied section 2D1.1(b)(1) for several reasons.  
First, he argues that the government waived its right to have 
section 2D1.1(b)(1) applied because "it unwisely and improperly 
chose to pursue the § 924(c)(1) charge, in lieu of a § 
2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement."  Br. at 19.  Second, Goggins argues, 
citing United States v. Watts, 67 F.3d 790, that the dismissal of 
the 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) count bars the application of section 
2D1.1(b)(1).  Third, he contends that "there was no connection 
between the firearm and the underlying offense" so that section 
2D1.1(b)(1) is inapplicable.  Br. at 24. 
          Fourth, Goggins attempts to distinguish our line of 
cases providing that if a conviction of one count of a multi- 
count indictment is vacated on appeal, on remand the district 
court may resentence the defendant to an increased sentence on 
the remaining counts so long as the total reimposed sentence does 
not exceed the original sentence.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Retos, 25 F.3d 1220, 1232-33 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that 
district court has discretion to resentence up to length of 
original sentence); United States v. Pelullo, 14 F.3d 881, 900 
(3d Cir. 1994) (holding that sentences can be increased on remand 
as long as reasons are identified); United States v. Busic, 639 
F.2d at 949-50.  He contends that these cases are inapplicable 
because his section 924(c)(1) "conviction was vacated, not as the 
result of a direct appeal, but as the result of a Motion to 
Vacate which the government consented to and the district court 
granted."  Br. at 25.  Furthermore, he points out that his motion 
to vacate his sentence challenged only the section 924(c)(1) 
conviction so that his "remaining conviction [was] untouched."  
Br. at 25.  Thus, in his view, the district court did not have 
jurisdiction to resentence him on the "untouched" count.  He also 
contends that the "effect of the § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement . . . 
was to resentence him on a lesser included offense after the 
greater offense had been thrown out, and not simply to resentence 
him on the remaining conviction," thus violating the double 
jeopardy protections.  Br. at 26. 
          We reject all of Goggins's contentions.  A grand jury 
indicted Goggins for the violation of section 924(c)(1).  Once 
Goggins pleaded guilty to that charge the government could not 
seek to have his sentencing level enhanced under section 
2D1.1(b)(1) because the commentary to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4 makes it 
clear that such enhancement would be prohibited double counting.  
U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4, Comment, background.  Thus, the government 
could not choose between the application of sections 2D1.1(b)(1) 
and 924(c)(1) at the sentencing.  Accordingly, the only basis for 
waiver would be on a sort of election of remedies theory:  that 
by seeking an indictment under section 924(c)(1) the government 
precluded itself from later seeking an enhancement under section 
2D1.1(b)(1).  We reject such an attenuated theory for there is no 
reason why facts relating to a count on which a defendant is 
acquitted or which is dismissed may not be germane with respect 
to a count on which he is convicted.  See United States v. Ryan, 
866 F.2d 604, 608 (3d Cir. 1989).  Furthermore, the government 
cannot be certain when a grand jury indicts a defendant what 
facts will be determined at the trial. 
          We also reject Goggins's argument that Goggins's 
acquittal of the section 924(c)(1) count has any bearing on this 
matter.  Rather, we align ourselves with the overwhelming 
majority of the courts of appeals which have held that a weapons 
enhancement under section 2D1.1(b)(1) is permissible after an 
acquittal under section 924(c)(1).  See, e.g., United States v. 
Pollard, 72 F.3d 66, 68-69 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. 
Barnes, 49 F.3d 1144, 1149-50 (6th Cir. 1995); United States v. 
Billops, 43 F.3d at 288; United States v. Ovalle-Marquez, 36 F.3d 
212, 224-25 (1st Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 1322 (1995); 
United States v. Romulus, 949 F.2d at 716-17; United States v. 
Coleman, 947 F.2d at 1428-29.  Pollard explains why this result 
is correct.  Section 2D1.1(b)(1) is broader than section 
924(c)(1) and so encompasses conduct not within section 
924(c)(1).  Furthermore, the burden of proof to impose an 
enhancement under section 2D1.1(b)(1) is less than the burden for 
a conviction under section 924(c)(1).  Pollard, 72 F.3d at 68-69.  
We also note that our result is consistent with the Supreme 
Court's recognition in Bailey that section 2D1.1(b)(1) is broader 
than section 924(c)(1).  Bailey, 116 S.Ct. at 509.  Of course, in 
this case it is perfectly clear that the facts supported the 
enhancement under section 2D1.1(b)(1) and accordingly we reject 
Goggins's argument to the contrary. 
          We also reject Goggins's argument that our cases 
allowing a court on remand to impose a greater sentence on a 
conviction on a count affirmed on appeal, after a sentence on 
another count is vacated, are distinguishable.  Plainly the 
proceedings after the original appeal were functionally the same 
as those which would follow a reversal of a conviction by this 
court.  In any event, the reason for allowing a resentencing on a 
conviction on a count upheld on appeal after an acquittal on 
another count, is to permit the court to impose the sentence 
which seems appropriate for the offense or offenses for which the 
defendant has been convicted validly by allowing the court to 
reconstruct the sentencing plan.  See United States v. Busic, 639 
F.2d at 952.  After all, if the district court knew at the time 
of the original sentencing that it could not sentence on all the 
counts on which the defendant was convicted, it might have 
imposed a greater sentence on the counts on which it could 
sentence validly.   
          Furthermore, inasmuch as we regard this case as 
functionally being the same as a case involving a reversal and a 
remand, the district court no more lost jurisdiction over the 
count not challenged on the motion to vacate than it would lose 
jurisdiction over a count on which a judgment of conviction is 
affirmed, but on which a new sentence is imposed after the court 
vacates a sentence on another count.  In this regard, we point 
out that Rodriguez v. United States, 933 F. Supp. 279, 283-85 
(S.D. N.Y. 1996), and Dossett v. United States, 931 F. Supp. 686, 
687-88 (D.S.D. 1966), which Goggins cites, and which would not 
allow resentencing on other counts after convictions under 
section 924(c)(1) were vacated, are distinguishable because the 
courts in those cases were entertaining proceedings under 28 
U.S.C. § 2255. Thus, the Rodriguez and Dossett courts themselves 
distinguished the collateral proceedings before them from 
proceedings on remand following a direct appeal.  As we have 
indicated, we regard the proceedings in the district court in the 
same way we would have regarded the case if we had reversed and 
remanded for resentencing.  Thus, we have no need to indicate 
whether we agree with Rodriguez and Dossett, though we do observe 
that other district courts have reached results contrary to those 
in Rodriguez and Dossett.  See, e.g., Mixon v. United States, 926 
F. Supp. 178, 181-82 (S.D. Ala. 1996).  Finally, we hold that, as 
Busic makes clear, 639 F.2d at 949-52, the resentencing did not 
violate double jeopardy principles. 
          The judgment of conviction and sentence entered March 
19, 1996, will be affirmed. 
                                         
